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I. INTRODUCTION
How would people feel if the U.S. Supreme Court, and not the voters,
decided which party controlled the U.S. House of Representatives? It would
seem contrary to the spirit of democracy, something that would disrupt the
1055
checks and balances of government we hold so dear. However, the
likelihood of this occurring is a very real possibility considering the outcome
of the 2000 election. First, the Supreme Court was left to resolve a
Presidential election that was decided by only 537 popular votes.' Further,
the election left a 50-50 split in the U.S. Senate and a slim ten vote margin
of control in the House of Representatives.2 Most people fail to realize that
the Supreme Court also decided which state would be allocated the 435th
and last seat in Congress in the 2002 term, though their decision appears to
have been incorrect.
3
The lines between the executive and judicial branch appear to be
blurring. If the Supreme Court continues to make mistakes in apportionment
cases, as it did in Utah v. Evans, it could be the judicial branch, and not the
voters, who will decide which party controls Congress.4
"The goal in Census 2000 was to conduct a census that was both
numerically and distributively accurate.",5 To achieve that goal the Census
Bureau employed approximatley 900,000 people to count the U.S.
population and spent over $6.5 billion in the process.6 The results of the
census showed the United States population to be 281,421,906 people.7
With 435 members serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, each
Representative represents approximately 646,952 people.'
When the counting was all done, the state of Utah fell 856 residents
short of gaining the last seat up for grabs; North Carolina was the recipient
of that seat.9 Utah, unhappy with these results, brought a lawsuit that
challenged the Census Bureau's methods for conducting the census arguing
that the Bureau's procedures violated both the Constitution and federal
statute.' 0 Once the lawsuit was filed, North Carolina, who was not named as
a party, participated in the litigation alongside the Secretary of Commerce
1. Jess Bravin & Robert S. Greenberger, Election 2000: U.S. Supreme Court's Voice Could be
Muted, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2000, at A14.
2. Jim VandeHei and Shailagh Murray, Bush's Ability to Exploit Democrats' Rifts Could be Key
to Advancing His Agenda, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,200 1, at A 16.
3. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 470 (internal quotations omitted).
6. Margo Anderson & Stephen E. Fienberg, The 2000 Census: Litigation, Results, and
Implications, 77 N.D. L. REV 665, 665 (2001). This was the largest peacetime workforce employed
in the history of the United States. Id.
7. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Your Gateway to Census 2000, at
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2002). The total population
for reapportionment purposes is slightly higher (281,424,177) because the reapportionment
population includes U.S. citizens living abroad who work for the U.S. government, while the normal
population count does not. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Apportionment
Population and Number of Representatives, by State: Census 2000, Table 1, at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab0l.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) [hereinafter
Apportionment Table]. Further, the apportionment count does not include citizens of the District of
Columbia because there is no Congressional seat there. ld.
8. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional Apportionment, at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportionment.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
9. Paul Foy, House Seat is up to Bench; North Carolina, Utah Fight for It, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 26, 2002, at 5A.
10. Id.
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(representing the U.S. government) to prevent losing the seat they had just
gained." North Carolina is no stranger to census litigation, as they appeared
before the Supreme Court four times regarding the results of the 1990
Census. 12
By the time Utah v. Evans was heard by the Supreme Court, the
Congressional race was well underway in the new, disputed, North Carolina
district.' 3 Utah was optimistic that they would prevail in the courts and drew
a new district in the event they were successful. 14 The ensuing legal fight is
evidence that the states care greatly about the reapportionment process. The
Court's decision in Utah v. Evans has implications not only on the use of
sampling in the census but also on Congressional redistricting, state funding,
the reluctance of citizens to participate in the census, and the caseload of
federal courts.'5
This note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. Evans.
Utah attempted to challenge the "hot-deck imputation"' 16 process used in
Census 2000 by suing the government, specifically Donald L. Evans, the
U.S. Secretary of Commerce. 1 Complicating Utah's challenge was the fact
that they were required to satisfy the constitutional requirements of
justiciability, proving that they had standing to bring their challenge.' 8
Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted Utah standing but ruled against them,
finding that the Census Bureau's "hot-deck imputation" process was
allowable under both the federal Census Act and the Constitution.' 9 Part II
of this article discusses the historical background of the census, the process
through which the census is taken, standing requirements particular to
11. See Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, Pick a Number, Any Number: State Representation
in Congress After the 2000 Census, 90 CAL. L. REV. 211, 211 (2002).
12. Id. See generally Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (holding invalid a district court's
finding that race rather than politics was the predominant factor in congressional redistricting plan);
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (holding that issues regarding whether a state redistricting
plan was drawn based on an illegal racial motive prevented summary judgment); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996) (holding that voters who did not live in the district in which they challenged the
election had no standing); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that an allegation of
improper redistricting legislation as an effort to segregate voting was sufficient for standing).
13. Anne Gearan, Supreme Court to Weigh in on Guesswork in Census, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Jan. 23, 2003, at A5.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
17. The Commerce Department houses the U.S. Census Bureau. U.S. Department of Commerce,
U.S. Census Bureau, Facts About the Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov/main/www
/aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
18. Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Utah 2001), aftid, 536 U.S. 452 (2002). The district
court characterized the case by stating that "[t]he State of Utah and numerous elected Utah officials
('Plaintiffs') bring this suit against the Secretary of Commerce and the Acting Director of the Census
Bureau ('Defendants') seeking injunctive and declaratory relief." Id. at 1167.
19. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 457 (2002). The Court concluded "that use of 'hot-deck
imputation' violates neither the statute nor the Constitution." Id.
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census cases, the Federal Census Act, and the "actual enumeration" clause of
the Constitution.2 ° Part III recounts the factual development of the litigation
in Utah v. Evans.21 Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. 22
Part V explores the probable impact of this decision23 and Part VI concludes
with a brief summary.24
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the Census
The census is taken every ten years pursuant to Article I, Section 2,
Clause 3 of the U. S. Constitution and subsequent legislation enacted by
Congress. 25 The census counts all persons whose usual residence is within
the United States on April 1st of the census year.26 The taking of a census in
the U.S. began around the time of the Revolutionary War when people were
regularly being counted in the British colonies.27 Immediately after the
colonies were granted their independence, the need for a census surfaced for
two reasons: the seats in the newly formed House of Representatives needed
to be allocated, and the states were asked to pay for their share of the costs
of the war based on their population.28 Thus, Article 1, Section 2 of the
Constitution was adopted, which called for an actual enumeration in order to
apportion representation and levy taxes.29  The first census was taken in
1790, yet it was quite different from the process that takes place today;
enumerators ventured out using their own papers, pencils, and other
materials.3" Today, the U.S. Census Bureau oversees a $6.5 billion process
and conducts the census in several phases that includes both mail-back forms
and personal interviews.
31
Since its inception, one of the primary uses of the census has been
apportioning the representatives in the House of Representatives.
"Apportionment is the process of dividing the 435 memberships, or seats, in
20. See infra notes 25-69 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 70-113 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 114-197 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (D. Utah 2001), affid, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
26. Jeffery D. Coleman & Julie L. Bentz, Redistricting and Reapportionment, ELECTION LAW
16-1 (Mathias W. Delart ed., 2002). In addition to providing the numbers for reapportioning the
House, "[t]he Federal Government considers census data in dispensing funds through federal
programs to the States, and the States use the results in drawing intrastate political districts."
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1,5-6 (1996).
27. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Factfinder for the Nation, at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/cff-4.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. U.S. Marshals supervised the first nine censuses. Id. In 1880, "Congress established a
census office in the U.S. Department of the Interior" and in 1913 the Census Bureau was moved to
its current home in the U.S. Department of Commerce. Id.
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the U.S. House of Representatives among the 50 states. 32  However the
process is not as simple as it sounds as some groups are not included in the
counts.33 Different apportionment methods have been used over the past two
centuries, yet the only real difference in methods has been over how to
round fractions, as the allocation process rarely leads to a whole number.34
Reapportionment is currently determined by the "method of equal
protections" which apportions the remaining 385 (of 435) seats among the
states, as the first fifty seats are reserved one per state to ensure that each
state receives at least one seat in compliance with the Constitution.
B. Standing Problems for Census Cases
A challenge to census reapportionment must clear an additional hurdle
before being heard by a court, that of justiciability. In doing so, a court must
decide whether the challenging plaintiff has standing to sue.36 Article III
Section 2 of the Constitution requires that there be an "actual case or
controversy" at issue for a court to hear a case and make a decision on the
merits. Thus, standing will be granted when the dispute is presented in an
32. U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Questions and Answers on
Apportionment, at http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportionment/faq.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2002) [herinafter Apportionment]. Apportionment differs from redistricting, which
is the "the process of creating new political units with distinct geographic boundaries and
substantially equal populations." Coleman & Bentz, supra note 26, at 16-5.
33. See Apportionment, supra note 32. Apportionment counts include all residents of the fifty
states (citizens and non citizens) and federal employees and their dependents living overseas
(including those in the U.S. Armed Forces). Id. The constitutionality of whether to include illegal
aliens in the census has not yet been resolved. See Ridge v. Verity, 715 F.Supp. 1308 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (holding that states that would be affected by the inclusion of illegal aliens in the census were
not identifiable, thus plaintiffs had no standing); see also Fed'n for Am. Immigration Reform v.
Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that states challenging the inclusion of illegal
aliens in the census lacked standing as they had failed to demonstrate any individualized harm).
Federal employees living overseas are allocated back to their home state based on records from the
federal department or agency that employs them. Apportionment. supra note 32. Private U.S.
citizens living abroad and those citizens living in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Island Areas are not counted for reapportionment purposes. Id.
34. Edelman & Sherry, supra note 11, at 216-17. Additional problems surface as some states
could be allocated zero representatives using some of these methods. Id. at 216-20.
35. Coleman & Bentz, supra note 26, at 16-6. The equal proportions method was codified at 2
U.S.C. § 2a in 1941. id. The method "takes each of the 385 seats to be allocated sequentially and
determines which state will receive each successive seat according to a mathematical formula" that
determines which of the 50 states has the highest priority. Id.
36. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 459 (2002) ("Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extends the
'judicial Power' of the United States to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies."'); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992) (holding that standing shall be denied when the
injury is not redressable and plaintiffs fail to assert sufficient personal injury); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (holding that to achieve standing the injury in fact must be traceable to the
challenged governmental conduct).
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adversarial context and the dispute is of the type typically "viewed as
capable of judicial resolution."37
Several lawsuits have sprung up based on differing interpretations of the
Census Act and justiciability requirements.38 In the 1981 U.S. Court of
Appeals case of Young v. Klutznick, the city of Detroit and its mayor brought
an action seeking adjustment of the 1980 Census because they alleged it
undercounted Blacks and Hispanics.39 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the mayor and the city lacked standing to bring the action because
the issue was not ripe for judicial review.40
The 1992 case of Franklin v. Massachusetts pitted the state of
Massachusetts and two registered Massachusetts voters against the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce.4' Massachusetts challenged the legality of the 1990
Census counting procedure.42 In practice, federal employees living overseas
were being counted as part of the census while private persons living abroad
were not being counted.43 Massachusetts argued that this distinction was
"arbitrary and capricious" and sought a recalculation that would have led to
one more Representative for their state. 44 In the U.S. Supreme Court, eight
justices found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case-four on
grounds that the court could review the Census Bureau's actions based on
the Administrative Procedure Act 45 and four finding that there was an actual
controversy that was adversary in nature and satisfied justiciability
requirements.46 As to the merits, the majority held that the allocation of
federal employees living overseas to their home states was in line with the
"usual residence" standard used in the census and served a valid purpose in
making representation in Congress more equal. 7
In the 1996 case of Wisconsin v. City of New York, citizens brought an
action challenging the Secretary of Commerce's decision not to statistically
adjust the 1990 Census for differential undercounting (those persons who are
not counted despite the Bureau's best efforts).48 After finding that the
37. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 438 (2002); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-
06 (1942) (holding that taxpayers have standing to challenge federal spending regulations so long as
the challenged spending deals with a spending power and the constitutional clause challenged was
intended to limit spending).
38. Since 1944 over thirty cases have been heard in the Supreme Court dealing with
reapportionment resulting from the census. See generally Dep't of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (discussing the major cases on reapportionment).
39. Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 619-23 (6th Cir. 1981). The plaintiffs used the Census
Bureau's own statistics to prove they were underrepresented. Id.
40. Id. at 624-26.
41. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 790-91 (1992).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (2002). The Administrative Procedure Act gives plaintiffs a way to
challenge an action of a federal administrative agency when no adequate form of review is
authorized by statute. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 549 (2002).
46. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803-07.
47. Id. at 803-06.
48. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1996). "In preparing for the 1990 census,
the Bureau and the task forces also looked into the possibility of using large-scale statistical
adjustment to compensate for the undercount." Id. at 8. The undercount resulted from several types
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plaintiffs had standing, the Supreme Court held that the Bureau's decision
not to adjust the results was not subject to heightened scrutiny and was
within the Bureau's constitutional discretion given them by Congress.
49
Thus the decision not to statistically adjust the census results was
constitutional.50
C. The Census Act
In 1976 Congress amended the Census Act to read "[e]xcept for the
determination of population for purposes of apportionment of
Representatives in Congress among the several states, the Secretary shall, if
he considers it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as
'sampling' in carrying out the provisions of this title."5' Thus, sampling is
clearly prohibited.52 Read as a whole, the Act gives Congress "virtually
unlimited discretion in conducting" the census.53 As a result, Congress has
delegated to the Secretary of Commerce the responsibility of taking the
census, and in doing so the Secretary of Commerce employs the assistance
of the Census Bureau.54
The amended Census Act also contains a timeline for reapportionment
that requires census results be tabulated and reported to the President within
nine months of the census date.55 Upon receipt of this report, the President
must provide Congress an additional report that shows the population of
each state and how many representatives it is entitled. 6 Pursuant to the Act,
the Clerk of the House of Representatives then sends the governor of each
state a certificate identifying the number of representatives it will be entitled
to in the next Congressional term.57
of errors in the census methods, including not counting individuals who were not found at their
residence, counting individuals who are not supposed to be counted, or double-counting some
individuals. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Id. The Court held that the "Secretary of Commerce, to whom Congress has delegated its
constitutional authority over the census, determined that in light of the constitutional purpose of the
census, an 'actual Enumeration' would best be achieved without ... statistical adjustment of the
results of the initial enumeration." Id. at 24.
51. 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1990). Sampling can be used to gather data on other characteristics of the
United States population (citizenship, ethnicity, income, housing, marital status) so long as an actual
enumeration is conducted in regards to apportionment. Coleman & Bentz, supra note 26, at 16-16.
52. See 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1990).
53. City ofNew York, 517 U.S. at 19.
54. Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (D. Utah 2001), affid, 536 U.S. 452 (2002)
(quoting 13 U.S.C. §§ 21, 141(a)).
55. 13 U.S.C. § 141(b).
56. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a).
57. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(b). The reports furnished to the governors by the Secretary of Commerce
contain population data by geographic units and also provides the basis for constitutional
redistricting. Coleman & Bentz, supra note 26, at 16-14. This census information is also used as the
sole basis from which federal programs allocate their funds to the states. Id.
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D. The Census Clause of the Constitution
The Constitution states that
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective Numbers .... The actual enumeration shall be
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of
the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years,
in such Manner as they shall by Law direct ... each state shall have
at Least one Representative.
58
The Fourteenth Amendment expanded this clause, stating
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed."5 9  It is the "actual enumeration"
language of the Constitution that has proved most problematic.
In the 1992 case of United States Department of Commerce v. Montana,
Montana voters brought a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Census
Act's method of "equal proportions" for determining the number of
representatives allocated to each state. 60 The Supreme Court held that this
method did not violate the constitutional requirement that apportionment of
representatives among states be done according to their respective
numbers. 6' The majority held that "[t]he decision to adopt the method of
equal proportions was made by Congress after decades of experience,
experimentation, and debate about the substance of the constitutional
requirement" and therefore Congress has the power to apply the method of
"equal proportions. 62
The 1999 case of U.S. Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of
Representatives involved a group of citizens bringing suit against the federal
agencies and officials who conduct the census, challenging their planned use
of sampling in the 2000 Census. 63 The Census Bureau's proposed plan was
for census employees to personally visit a portion of the households that did
not respond to the mail-back form and to use that information to estimate
information about the remaining nonresponders in that census tract. 64 The
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
60. United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 446 (1992). In the 1990
Census the state of Montana lost one of its two seats, thereby cutting its delegation in half. Id. at
445. The state then challenged the "equal proportions" method on the grounds that it "'does not
achieve the greatest possible equality in the number of individuals per representative."' Id. at 446.
61. Id. at 465.
62. Id.
63. United States Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,
320 (1999). The Bureau was attempting to correct for the traditional "undercount," which are
households that despite the Bureau's best efforts still remain uncounted. Id. "Some identifiable
groups-including certain minorities, children, and renters-have historically had substantially
higher undercount rates than the population as a whole." Id. at 322-23.
64. Id. The maximum number of units which could be estimated per given tract was set at 10%.
Id. at 322-24.
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Bureau planned on randomly selecting certain census blocks to survey in-
person to find discrepancies, and use that information to adjust national
census numbers to account for the undercount.65 The Court granted standing
in House of Representatives because the plaintiffs were able to prove they
had lost a seat in the House and would suffer a dilution in their voting
strength.66 "[I]t is certainly not necessary for this Court to wait until the
census has been conducted to consider the issues presented here, because
such a pause would result in extreme-possibly irremediable-hardship. 6 1
As to the merits, the Court held that the Census Act prohibited the use of
statistical sampling, whether as either a supplement or substitute for
traditional methods of enumeration used for calculating the population.68
"[W]e conclude that the Census Act prohibits the proposed uses of statistical
sampling in calculating the population for purposes of apportionment. ' 69
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2000, the Census Bureau's first attempt to gather data was through a
questionnaire that was delivered by mail to homes in mid-March, 2000.70
These surveys were to be completed by the households and returned by mail
to the Bureau.7  The Census Bureau estimated that 61% of the mail-out
surveys would be returned. 72  Approximately one-sixth of mail-out
questionnaires contained a "long form" that contained more detailed
questions about the residents' employment, commuting patterns, education,
disability, and citizenship 3.7  In cases where either the mail-out questionnaire
65. Id. at 325.
66. Id. at 334.
67. Id. at 332.
68. Id. at 343.
69. Id.
70. The Census Bureau developed a master address file containing the mailing address of every
housing unit in the United States, which was compiled based on data from the U.S. Postal Service
and the address list compiled in the 1990 Census. Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169; see
also Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 6, at 676. The 2000 census involved more than 147 million
paper questionnaires with 1.5 billion pages of printed material. Appellee's Brief at 14, Utah v.
Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
71. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
72. The actual return rate for the short forms was 67%, with a 55% rate for the long forms.
Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 6, at 678. In 1990 the Census Bureau estimated a 65% response
rate. Id. Prior to 1964, census employees personally visited each housing unit to make a count but
this proved impracticable in later years. Thomas R. Lee, The Original Understanding of the Census
Clause: Statistical Estimates and the Constitutional Requirement of an "Actual Enumeration," 77
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002); see also United States Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 337 (1999) (citing Census Act of Aug. 31, 1964, 78 Stat. 737).
73. See Anderson & Fienberg, supra, note 6, at 676-77. The "short form" that went to the
remaining five-sixths of the population contained only six questions per person living in the
household and one question as to whether the home was owned or rented. The long form
questionnaires sparked a debate over the privacy rights of those filling out the forms. Id.
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was not returned, there was missing information, information was
contradictory or conflicting, or there was a mistake, a census employee was
deployed to visit the address to fill in the gaps or correct the mistakes.74
No matter the procedure used, there will still be some households which
go uncounted (the undercount) due to a variety of factors including citizens'
reluctance to respond to the mail-out questionnaires and errors in address
files.75 In 2000, the Census Bureau, for the first time, began using "hot-deck
imputation" to clear up conflicting responses and gain missing information.76
The "hot-deck imputation" method provided a last resort to fill in the gaps. 77
This method "imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address
or unit about which [data] is uncertain has the same population
characteristics as those of a 'nearby sample or donor' address. '78 The donor
address is the "'geographically closest neighbor of the same type (i.e.,
apartment or single family dwelling) that did not return a census
questionnaire' by mail," ensuring the information was personally collected
by a census employee.79 For example, if no information could be gained
about the residents of 4003 Elm Street, the Bureau would take the
information from the house nearest 4003 Elm that required an in-person visit
(for example 4009 Elm) and assume that 4003 Elm has the same number of
residents as 4009. The alternative argued by Utah was to assume there are
no residents at 4003 Elm and enter a zero value.80 Nationally 1.2 million
people (0.4% of the population) were imputed through this "hot-deck
imputation" process in 2000, though the geographic distribution of imputed
persons was uneven.81
The Secretary of Commerce provided President Clinton the Census
2000 data on December 28, 2000 and this information was given to the
Clerk of the House of Representatives January 4, 2001.82 The state of Utah
was informed that its number of representatives would remain unchanged on
January 16, 2001, and learned shortly thereafter (after release of the
74. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 477 (2002). Up to six attempts were made per household
before imputation was used. Id. The imputation phase was begun in late April and completed by
June 27, 2000. Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 6, at 678. The 1980 Census did not use any
sampling methods due to a fear of their legality, but did use imputation to fill in incomplete non-
apportionment related data. Appellee's Brief at 6, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
The 1990 Census did not take any samples and employed imputation only in the final editing stage.
Id. at 8.
75. Lee, supra note 72, at 9.
76. Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Utah 2001), afftd, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
There are three types of imputation that can be used: status imputation which estimates whether or
not there really is a housing unit physically at an address, occupancy imputation which estimates
whether a unit is occupied or vacant, and household size imputation which estimates how many
people actually live there. Id. at 1169-70.
77. Gearan, supra note 13, at A5.
78. Evans, 536 U.S. at 458.
79. Id. (quoting Appellants Brief at 7-8, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (01-714)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
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technical data) how close they had come to gaining an additional House
seat.83
As a result of the census data, North Carolina gained the 435th and last
seat, bringing their total to thirteen, a gain of one seat.84 Utah would have
gained this last seat with 857 more residents.85 It is interesting, but not
entirely explainable, that North Carolina gained four times as many
households through imputation than Utah.86 All told a total of 12 seats in the
House shifted as a result of the 2000 Census. 87  North Carolina and Utah
both agreed that "but for" the use of the imputation process, Utah would
have gained the last House seat88 (bringing their total to four) and North
Carolina would have undergone no change (remaining at 12).89
The case that is the subject of this note, Utah v. Evans, was Utah's
second challenge to the results of the 2000 Census. 90 Utah argued in an
earlier challenge, also titled Utah v. Evans, that excluding Church of Latter
Day Saints (LDS) missionaries who lived abroad from the census count
violated various federal statutes and the Constitution.9' Utah claimed that
the LDS missionaries have stronger ties to their home states than the
overseas federal employees who are counted, thus the missionaries should be
counted just like federal employees. 92 If the missionaries were counted,
Utah would have gained the necessary residents to pry the last available seat
away from North Carolina. 93 The U.S. District Court found that Utah had
standing in this challenge, but held that inclusion of federal government
83. Id.; see also Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 6, at 686-87.
84. See Apportionment Table, supra note 7.
85. Gearan, supra note 13, at A5.
86. Foy, supra note 9, at AS. In 1990 the situation was reversed, Utah had a higher rate of
imputation than North Carolina. Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at 24, Utah v.
Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01 -714).
87. See Apportionment Table, supra note 7. New York and Pennsylvania each lost two
Congressional seats. Id. Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Wisconsin each lost one Congressional seat. id. Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and Texas each gained
two Congressional seats. Id. California, Colorado, Nevada, and North Carolina each gained one
Congressional seat. Id. All other states remained unchanged. Id.
88. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
89. See Apportionment Table, supra note 7.
90. See Utah v. Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 2001). Unless otherwise specified Utah v.
Evans in this note deals with the case challenging imputation.
91. Id. at 1293. The number of LDS missionaries living abroad on Census Day (April 1, 2000)
totaled 24,251. Id. at 1298. Forty-six percent (11,159) of these missionaries were from Utah. Id.
92. Tony Mauro, Brothers Follow Father's Footsteps to the Supreme Court, TEXAS LAWYER,
November 26, 2001, at 16.
93. Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. Utah argued that the Census Bureau should "enumerate, out
of the entire universe of non-federal-employee Americans abroad on April 1, 2000, only LDS
missionaries, a course of action which would overwhelmingly favor Utah vis-A-vis all forty-nine
other states." Id. The Court was not impressed by this request, and found that it would be contrary
to the goal of the Census which is to "'to achieve a fair apportionment for the entire country."' Id.
(quoting United States Dep't of Comm. v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,464 (1992)).
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employees did not mandate the inclusion of a religious denomination's
missionaries living abroad, and denied Utah's claim for relief.
94
Once Utah sued the Secretary of Commerce in this second action
(challenging the "hot-deck imputation procedures"), the U.S. government, at
President Bush's advisement, sided with North Carolina and hoped the
Supreme Court would not get involved. 5 The U.S. government did however
concede, as had North Carolina, that if the imputation procedure were
thrown out in court and the imputed values were replaced with zeros, Utah
would be awarded the last seat and no other state's allotment of
Representatives would be affected.96
As for the remedy sought, Utah sought an injunction to compel the
government to issue a new census report that had different results that were
achieved by taking out all the imputed data and replacing it with zero
values. 97  In the district court the government argued that Utah's claim
lacked standing because the district court did not have the power to affect
the results as they already had been sent from the Clerk of the House to the
respective states. However, the district court disagreed and found that
Utah did have standing and that its claims were justiciable based on the
holding in Franklin.99 The district court assumed the grievance was
redressible and "if the President transmits revised reapportionment
calculations to Congress, the Clerk of the House of Representatives would
submit a new certificate to the states." °
Substantively, Utah argued to the district court that the census
procedures were unconstitutional for two separate and distinct reasons: they
violated both the Federal Census Act and the Census Clause of the
Constitution.' °  The district court first addressed the argument that the
Bureau's imputation method violated the Census Act's prohibition on
sampling for purposes of an apportionment count.10 2  Utah argued that
sampling and imputation were essentially the same process, wherein a
portion of the whole population is estimated using a sample.1 0 3 The district
court disagreed and found against Utah holding that sampling and
imputation are separate, different, and distinct; in their view sampling uses a
set of units to represent the whole population while imputation is a
"procedure for determining a plausible value for missing data."' 1 4  The
94. Id. at 1301.
95. See Gearan, supra note 13, at A5.
96. See Foy, supra note 9, at A5.
97. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 459 (2002).
98. Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (D. Utah 2001), affd, 536 U.S. 452 (2002). It
was agreed by both parties that injunctive relief could be sought to prohibit the use of imputation in
the 2010 census, although the parties differed as to what could be done regarding the injunction
sought to remedy the effects of Census 2000. Id.
99. Id. at 1171 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)).
100. ld. at 1172.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1174.
103. Id. at 1175.
104. Id. at 1176. The Court seemed persuaded by the language in Wisconsin v. City of New York
that stated "so long as the Secretary's conduct of the census is 'consistent with the constitutional
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion
The majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court was written by Justice
Breyer, who was joined in the opinion by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.' 4 The issue for decision was framed
as "whether the Census Bureau's use in the year 2000 census of a
methodology called 'hot-deck imputation' either (1) violates a statutory
provision forbidding use of 'the statistical method known as 'sampling' or
(2) is inconsistent with the Constitution's statement that an 'actual
Enumeration' be made."'
' 15
As to the standing issue, the U.S. government argued that the federal
courts, and thereby the Supreme Court, lacked the power to hear this case."
16
Their argument was that the Court did not have the power to change the
allocation of House seats two years after the results had been certified, and
that the Court did not "have the power to 'redress' the 'injury' that the
defendant allegedly 'caused' the plaintiff.""' 7
In deciding the standing issue the Court wrote "[w]e can find no
significant difference between the plaintiff in Franklin and the plaintiff
(Utah) here. Both brought their lawsuits after the census was complete.
Both claimed that the Census Bureau followed legally improper counting
methods." ' 1 8  In essence, the Court disagreed with the government's
argument and adopted a more flexible approach to the standing
requirements. 19 In the Court's view, corrections to the census are always
permitted so long as a new report could be issued and the President could
submit the new results to the Clerk of the House. 120 Therefore, in this case
there was no bar to redress.'
2 1
The government also argued that Public Law 105-119, Title II, § 209
(b), 111 Stat. 2481, barred the bringing of this challenge because it provided
that "'any person aggrieved by the use of any [unlawful] statistical method'
[may] bring 'a civil action' for declaratory or injunctive 'relief against the
use of such method"'-thus requiring all suits to be brought before the
114. Id. at 456.
115. Id. at 457.
116. Id. at 459. Neither side denied the fact that the federal courts had the power to order the
Secretary of Commerce to adjust the numbers already reported and to recertify the results; the
argument stemmed over what authority the courts had to force the President to certify a new
allocation of U.S. House seats. Id. at 460-61.
117. Id. at 459 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); see also Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). North Carolina argued in their brief that the only way that the
reapportionment in this case could be remedied was through implementation of a different system in
the next census or by an act of Congress adopted before the next census. Appellee's Brief at 25,
Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
118. Evans, 536 U.S. at 460.
119. See id. at 462-64.
120. Id. at 463-64.
121. Id. at462.
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district court next analyzed Utah's argument that the Constitution requires
an "actual enumeration" (a headcount) of U.S. residents as opposed to some
other form of sampling or estimation.' °5 Utah maintained that the Framers
of the U.S. Constitution understood the difference between an actual
enumeration and a sample, and chose the term enumeration for a specific
reason.106 The district court held against Utah on this issue as well, stating
that the Census Bureau's procedures were "reasonably consistent with the
accomplishment of an actual enumeration of the population."',0 7 Judge
Greene dissented at the district court level based on a theory that imputation
violated the Census Act. 10 8 Judge Greene advocated a plain reading of the
statute, which would demonstrate that sampling is clearly prohibited.' °9 To
Judge Greene, the essence of imputation is that, deep down, it really is
sampling."t He points out in his dissent that the Census Bureau itself has, in
some instances, defined sampling very broadly as "whenever the
information on a portion of a population is used to infer information on the
population as a whole," which would seem to encompass the challengedimputation. 1
As a procedural matter, appeals in reapportionment cases "skip the
Circuit Courts of Appeals and go directly to the Supreme Court" through a
process that gives the Supreme Court less discretion to decline review." 2
Thus, Utah v. Evans arrived at the Supreme Court and oral argument took
place March 27, 2002."'
language and constitutional goal of equal representation,' it is within the limits of the Constitution."
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1996).
105. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
106. Id. at 1178-79; see also Justice Thomas's view on this argument, infra notes 169-90 and
accompanying text.
107. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
108. Id. at 1180 (Greene, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1181 (Greene, J., dissenting).
110. Id. Judge Greene stated that "[m]anifestly, 'sampling' and 'imputation' in substance and
effect are indistinguishable because both use a portion of the population to infer information
concerning segments of the population in order to arrive at final figures concerning the population as
a whole." Id. at 1183 (Greene, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 1181 (Greene, J., dissenting) (quoting United States Department of Commerce Bureau
of Census, Report to Congress-The Plan for Census 2000, at 23 (revised Aug. 1997)). The report
itself states that "'[tlhe Census Bureau also has used a form of statistical estimation to adjust or
correct its actual headcount."' Id. at 1182 n.2 (quoting The Plan for Census 2000).
112. Mauro, supra note 92, at 16.
113. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
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completion of the census. 12 2  The Court disagreed, and again chose to
construe this limitation on their jurisdiction narrowly; holding that this
statute does not bar a post census challenge and that the Court will consider
lawsuits brought "soon enough after completion of the census." '123 Thus,
Utah had standing.
124
As to Utah's first challenge, based on the Census Act, it hinged on
interpretations of the words 'sampling' and 'imputation. ' 125  An example
using a library was used both in oral argument and in the majority opinion to
explain the differences between 'sampling' and 'imputation.' 126 Imagine a
librarian wants to determine how many books are in a library. 27 If they
count the books on every tenth shelf and extrapolate these results to the
entire library (multiply by ten), this would be sampling. 128 If, however, the
librarian is counting the books one-by-one and finds a shelf that is empty
(where all the books have been checked out) and fills in data for that shelf by
giving it the same value as the shelf above or below it, this would be akin to
imputation. 1
29
The government emphasized in their argument these key differences
between sampling and imputation, which justified using the "hot-deck
imputation" method. 130 As to the nature of the enterprise, the government
argued that sampling is an overall approach which relies on data collected
from a part to estimate a whole.13 ' In contrast, imputation was presented as
"a method of processing data (giving a value to missing data)" that is not an
overall approach to counting. 132 Regarding methodology, the government
argued that "sampling focuses on using statistically valid sample-selection
techniques to determine what data to collect," 133 while imputation does not
rely on that same sample selection methodology. 134 As to their immediate
objectives, the government argued that "sampling seeks immediately to
extrapolate the sample's relevant population characteristics to the whole
122. Id.
123. Id. at 463.
124. Id. at 464.
125. Id. at 464-66.
126. Id. at 465. This analogy was presented by U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson during oral
argument for the government. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-26, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452
(2002) (No. 01-714).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally Appellee's Brief, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
131. Evans, 536 U.S. at 466.
132. Id. Sampling is defined in the dictionary as "[a] portion, piece, or segment that is
representative of a whole ... [or, a] set of elements drawn from and analyzed to estimate the
characteristics of a population." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000).
133. Evans, 536 U.S. at 466.
134. Id.
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population" while imputation attempts to determine the characteristics of the
missing information. 135  Thus, imputation "was used to assure that an
individual unit (not a 'subset'), chosen nonrandomly, will resemble other
individuals (not a 'whole') selected by the fortuitous unavailability of
data."136 The government's overall argument was that the term "sampling"
suggested a term of art with a technical meaning and imputation does not fit
within that meaning.
137
In contrast, Utah argued that imputation was just a masked version of
sampling and that "Congress did not have imputation in mind in 1958 when
it wrote that law" or it would have been outlawed as well. 138  Further,
imputation is just as much a method of sampling as the procedure that was
struck down in House of Representatives.139 If anything, Utah felt that the
sampling in House of Representatives was even more statistically valid than
the "hot-deck imputation" process used in 2000.140 In their brief, Utah
argued that "random sampling is significantly more reliable and accurate, as
a scientific matter, than non-random methods such as hot-deck
imputation."'14' In Utah's eyes, the Census Bureau interpreted its own statute
to mean whatever it wanted, allowing the new imputation procedure to be
valid. 142
When analyzing this statutory question, the Court distinguished the case
at hand from House of Representatives.143 In House of Representatives the
Court felt that the Bureau planned at the outset to sample and extrapolate
characteristics of the population based on the sample.'" Thus, there was a
deliberate decision in advance to take a sample, while in this case there was
135. Id.
136. Id. at 467. The reasons behind using sampling and imputation are different. Sampling saves
money by counting a subset, imputation saves no money and may in fact cost more in an effort to not
place a zero value for the missing information. Id. at 469-70.
137. Id. at 467-68. The Court quotes a textbook as saying "'sample, as it is used in the [statistics]
literature.., means a subset of the population that is used to gain information about the entire
population"' and that sampling is "'a method of selecting a fraction of the population in a way that
the selected sample represents the population."' Id. (quoting G. HENRY, PRACTICAL SAMPLING 11
(1990); P. SUKHATME, SAMPLING THEORY OF SURVEYS WITH APPLICATIONS 1 (1954)). The
government argued that all definitions of sampling have the following in common: 1) the sample
must be a fraction of the subset or part of the population that the sample is intended to represent and
2) that the sample is chosen according to some method to ensure that it will be a valid model of the
larger population. Id.
138. ld. at 468.
139. See Appellant's Brief at 15, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
140. Id. at 15. Utah argued that even if there is ambiguity it should be resolved in such a way that
would avoid serious constitutional problems. Id.
141. Id. at 34.
142. Evans, 536 U.S. at471.
143. Id. at 471-72. The Court believed that "the Bureau's ... deliberate decision taken in advance
to find an appropriate sample. .. and the quantitative figures at issue ... all taken together
distinguish [the procedure in House of Representatives]-in degree if not in kind-from the
imputation here at issue." Id. at 471.
144. Id. at 471. The Bureau would sample certain census blocks and extrapolate these results to
the global census count. Id. In House of Representatives, 10% of a tract would have been
extrapolated or sampled, while in this case only .4% of the population nationwide was determined by
imputation. Id.
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no intent to sample. 14 5 In a sense, the Court attempted to determine the
mindset of the Census Bureau before the census process actually began.
As for the Constitutional issue, Utah argued that the words "actual
enumeration" required the Bureau to do an in-person headcount-to seek out
each individual resident and count them. 4 6 There was quite a difference
between how Utah and the government defined the term "enumeration."
Each side presented various definitions in their briefs and at oral argument.
Definitions that were offered included an "act of numbering or counting
over"'147 or "numbering or summing up.' 148  The government argued that
when the Framers were deciding on the language to use "[w]hat was at
issue . . . were fundamental principles of representation itself ... not the
secondary matter of exactly how census data was to be compiled," thus they
argued the Framers were mostly concerned with accuracy. 149 In their view,
had the Framers been concerned with the actual compilation of the census,
they would have written a detailed methodology on how to conduct the
census into the Constitution.
50
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that "the use of 'hot-deck
imputation' did not violate the "actual enumeration" language of the
Constitution." '5' The Court was convinced that enumeration referred to a
counting process, and the modifier "actual" in the Constitution was only
used to show that this would take effect for the third session of Congress, as
the allocation of Representatives for the first two Congressional sessions
were done by a mere guess.1
52
It is interesting that the holding in this case turns on an interpretation of
the words "actual enumeration" more than 200 years after they were
written. 53  The Court may have been persuaded by the government's
argument that the words "actual enumeration" were merely a stylistic change
145. Id.
146. Appellant's Brief at 35, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
147. Evans. 536 U.S. at 475 (citing I S. JOHNSON. A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
658 (4th rev. ed. 1773)).
148. Id. (citing N. BAILEY. AN ETYMOLOGICAL ENGIISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789)). "Amicus
urges this Court to reject an interpretation of the Constitution that forever precludes the Census
Bureau from using all tools at its disposal accurately to count the population and that therefore
ensures that systematic biases in the headcount will continue to be reflected through
misrepresentation in Congress." Brief of Amicus Curiae of Brennan Center for Justice at 1, Utah v.
Evans. 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
149. Evans. 536 U.S. at 478.
150. Id. at 479.
151. Id. at 457.
152. Id. at 474.
153. The dictionary defines "actual" to mean -[elxisting and not merely potential or possible:
being, existing, or acting at the present moment: current." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY FOR
THE ENGIISH LANGUAGE 18 (4th ed. 2000).
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in the Constitution made later in the drafting. 15 4  Just as the word
"enumeration" was chosen to mean an individual counting, the word
"actual" seems to have been chosen because it strengthened the word
enumeration. Had the Framers wanted to allow for a sample of the
population, they were free to include the word 'sample' in the language of
the clause, yet they chose not to. The Court attempts to read the clause not
as "actual enumeration" but as "which number [of inhabitants] shall ... be
taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct," which is similar to an
earlier draft, one that was never ratified.' 55
It is also of note that Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the more liberal
members of the Court in this decision while he sided with his more
conservative colleagues in House of Representatives.156  Maybe Chief
Justice Rehnquist feared that if the Court ordered President Bush to do
something he might refuse (change the result), a situation similar to that of
President Nixon refusing to turn over the Watergate tapes might have
arisen.
15 7
B. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's
holding regarding whether the imputation process is contrary to the language
of the Census Act, but concurred as to the rest of the majority's decision.158
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in House of Representatives in
which the Court struck down the Census Bureau's proposed use of sampling
in 1990, and took a similar stance in this case.' 59 As to the definition of
sampling, Justice O'Connor stated that "'sampling' occurs whenever the
information on a portion of a population is used to infer information on the
population as a whole .... [although] [a]mong professional statisticians, the
term 'sample' is reserved for instances when the selection of the smaller
population is based on the methodology of their science."' 160 This, in her
opinion, clearly makes imputation a subset of sampling. 16' The donor
groups used to provide the data to be imputed were subsets of subsets, and
thus produced an estimate. 162 Therefore, this process was just as artificial as
154. United States Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,
363 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Evans, 536 U.S. at 474. This was the original phrase of the clause. Id.
156. Id. at 456; House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 320.
157. See generally United States v. Nixon, 481 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that President Nixon
must comply with the special prosecutor's request for tape recordings made between the President
and his advisors that may concern matters relevant to the Watergate investigation).
158. Evans, 536 U.S. at 479-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
159. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 316.
160. Evans, 536 U.S. at 482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Report
to Congress-The Plan for Census 2000, at 23 (Aug. 1997)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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any other type of nonrandom sampling, including what had been proposed in
House of Representatives.63
Justice O'Connor was also careful to point out that the decision "to
impute or not impute," no matter who makes it, could be "a source of
possible manipulation" and therefore a clear message needs to be sent as to
what constitutes sampling. 64 She argued that the Court should not throw the
baby out with the bath water; just because the alternative to imputation is to
use a zero value is no reason to use an otherwise flawed method.1 65 Further,
"phantom households" could be counted through imputation that may
actually be businesses, storage units, or typographical errors on the master
address lists, all of which could lead to over-counting.1
66
In an interview after oral arguments, Justice O'Connor stated, "[a]s I
understand it, [the method] has the effect of counting non-households as
households or some households twice .... I was concerned because it
seems to be a method that amounts to what we said couldn't be done [in
House of Representatives], but on a smaller scale." 167  Thus, Justice
O'Connor was of the opinion that Congress did not have imputation in mind
when it drafted or amended the Census Act, and therefore dissented based on
her view that the "hot-deck imputation" process stands at odds with the
language of the Census Act, prohibiting sampling. 168
C. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas dissented on the issue of whether the imputation process
was a violation of the constitutional requirement of an 'actual enumeration,'
and concurred with all other parts of the decision.169 Justice Thomas felt that
the Framers knew what they were doing when drafting the Constitution and
referred several times to the 18th Century Definition of "actual
enumeration" in his opinion.,70
163. Id. at 483-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This process is distinguishable in degree only. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 487 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 488 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166. Foy, supra note 9 at 5A. In their brief, Utah argued that "[w]hile it is supposed to consist
entirely of residential addresses, the Master Address File is known to contain addresses for
businesses, storage units, and other erroneously included information." Appellant's Brief at 8, Utah
v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
167. Charles Lane, O'Connor Hints She May Side with Utah in Census Case, WASH. POST, March
28, 2002, at A13.
168. Evans, 536 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 488-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Thomas's dissent.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 488-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas argues that words need to be employed in
their "natural sense" and be used as they were intended. Id. at 491 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice Thomas, the Framers knew they were asking for an
individualized count. 171 By the time the Constitution was ratified the words
'actual enumeration' were widely used in both the United States and
Britain. 172 The ratified version of the Constitution contains the terms "actual
enumeration," and to Justice Thomas the other drafts, no matter what they
say, do not matter - not even as legislative history. 173 Justice Thomas cited
writings of several prominent figures of the constitutional era to show that
citizens at that time understood the difference between an enumeration and
an estimate. 1
74
Justice Thomas cited commentators demonstrating that the Framers
would have been historically familiar with the word "census."' Further,
the concept of an "actual count" appears clear, as there is evidence that the
Framers feared a complete enumeration would be expensive and
troublesome, yet still chose this process over sampling in spite of its
drawbacks. 176  Many British academics discussed taking partial
enumerations and supplementing them with estimates. 177 Discussions also
took place over whether "an actual enumeration generally would be more
accurate than a gross estimate, [as] an enumeration itself was not perfect and
would result in an inevitable undercount.' 17 8  George Washington was
concerned that a complete enumeration of the population would yield a
larger result than an estimate previously offered, demonstrating his
understanding of the differing concepts.
179
Justice Thomas also argued that it is clear the Framers wanted to force
the existence of an actual enumeration so as to minimize the risk of political
manipulation in the apportionment of seats. 180 The Framers were careful
when crafting their language as they knew that "changes in population shift
the balance of power among them."' 8'1 The Framers "chose their words with
171. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. Lee, supra note 72, at 20.
173. Evans, 536 U.S. at 495 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 494 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "Historians and commentators after the founding also
distinguished actual enumerations from conjectures, demonstrating that there was a common
understanding of these terms." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 494-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Lee, supra note 72, at 33 (citing John
Rickman, Thoughts on the Utility and Facility of Ascertaining the Population, THE COMMERCIAL
AND AGRICULTURAL MAGAZINE 391 (June 1800), for the idea that the word 'census' comes from the
"Census of Roman Citizens" which was done "by collecting them in their respective municipia, and
firmly enumerating all who made their appearance").
176. Lee, supra note 72, at 46-47. When describing the Articles of Confederation the comment
was made that "New Hampshire complained that her [estimated] number was too high; and in 1782,
caused an actual enumeration to be made." Id. at 42 (citing TIMOTHY PITKIN, A STATISTICAL VIEW
OF THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 582 (1835)).
177. Id. at 37-39 (citing D.V. GLASS, NUMBERING THE PEOPLE: THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
POPULATION CONTROVERSY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENSUS AND VITAL STATISTICS IN
BRITAIN (1973)).
178. Id. at 38.
179. Id. at41.
180. Evans, 536 U.S. at 489 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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precision" and the Framers "'must be understood to have employed words in
their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.""1
82
The evidence of word usage by the Framers is hard to ignore. During
the Constitutional era "enumerate" was defined as counting distinctly while
"actual" meant something that was really done. 83 Conjecture and estimation
were terms contrasted with actual enumeration.' 84  At the time of the
constitutional convention some colonies were making actual enumerations,
while others were making estimates. 185 Thus, the differences must have
been clear. 186 The founders may have wanted to "shackle" the legislature so
that future sessions of Congress could not change the process to their
benefit, thereby choosing the language of the Constitution that would need
to be obeyed.
187
"Because hot-deck imputation is an estimation procedure that includes
persons not 'actually' counted, its use to adjust the census for apportionment
purposes runs afoul of the Constitution."' 188  Congress has discretion to
decide on the manner of conducting the census, yet this is not total
discretion, and they must at least follow the Constitution. 89 Thus, in the
eyes of Justice Thomas, conducting an "actual enumeration" remains a
constitutional requirement that was not satisfied by the Bureau's hot-deck
imputation process in Census 2000.190
D. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's determination that Utah had
standing to bring its challenge.' 9' This is the same decision reached by
Justice Scalia in the Franklin case.' 92 Justice Scalia was caught up in the
procedural nuisances of the Census Act, and found that Utah did not
demonstrate that federal courts have the power to redress the injury that had
taken place. 193 Even if the court ordered a new report, Justice Scalia argued,
Utah would not be redressed unless the President gave the new report to
182. Id. at 491 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824)).
183. Evans, 536 U.S. at 492 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 658 (4th rev. ed. 1773)).
184. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 500-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 508-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 494 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 510-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 823-
29(1992)).
193. Id. at 510-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Congress. 194 Justice Scalia believed that he could not assume the President
would comply with the Court's decision, nor did the Court have the power to
direct the President to do an act unless the President was sued. In this
instance only the Secretary of Commerce was sued. 195 For Scalia, the only
other way that Utah could redress its injury would be for Congress to pass a
law giving North Carolina's seat to Utah. 19 6 Thus, Scalia refused to reach
the merits of the case and found Utah had no standing to bring their
challenge. 1
97
V. IMPACT
The judicial landscape of apportionment cases looks uncertain after
Utah v. Evans. With the Court split 5-3 (one justice did not reach the merits)
in favor of a broad interpretation of both the Census Act and enumeration
clause, it would seem that the Census Bureau is at liberty to use procedures
that border on sampling, so long as they are disguised in non-sampling terms
such as imputation. 198  In the Utah v. Evans scenario, the "hot-deck
imputation" process was even less reliable than a random sampling of the
population. 99 The arbitrary use of the geographically closest residence
leaves too much room for error. It leads one to question how many
businesses were imputed with residents when no one lived there. Yet the
Court was eager to accept this new process, and one cannot help but wonder
what else the Census Bureau, or the Supreme Court, will allow.
The Utah v. Evans decision will also affect the way the Census Bureau
integrates new technology into its procedures. Technology would seem to
be even more dangerous to use with the census, as it could easily lead to
manipulation and non-enumeration counting techniques. Consider that forty
years ago all U.S. residents were counted in person, yet today the majority of
the data is gathered through mail-back forms; it is likely the information
gathered in 2040 could be done electronically.
If the Census Bureau is placed in a situation where they need to cut
costs, the decision in Utah v. Evans paves the way for the Bureau to revert to
procedures that do not produce an "actual enumeration." 2°  With proper
194. Id. at 511 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia feels that the President would be free to refuse to
issue a new reapportionment statement to Congress. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 513-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Justices Rehnquist, Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg all turned a blind eye and allowed
the imputation process to remain. See generally id. Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Kennedy all
dissented, either because they felt that the Constitution or the Census Act had been violated. See id.
Justice Scalia's view as to the merits is still a mystery as he felt Utah lacked standing to bring the
case. See id. at 510-515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rehnquist sides with the more liberal members of
the Court and against the Republican administration. See id at 456. However, Rehnquist came
down on the side of his more conservative colleagues in the House of Representatives case three
years earlier. See generally United States Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
199. Appellant's Brief at 38, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
200. See supra notes 6 and 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the costs of the Census
and the number of people the Census Bureau employs.
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approval, the Census Bureau could employ a few dozen statisticians to make
the census count, doing away with the 900,000 employees it took to
complete Census 2000.201 This decision also affects other uses of Census
data, including funding for federal programs and the drawing of legislative
districts at both the state and local levels.
It is clear that despite the Bureau's best efforts, there has always been an
undercount.2 °2 Had Utah been successful in its challenge, the Bureau would
have been forced to decide on other methods to remedy this problem.2 °3 The
Court was possibly persuaded by the fact that the use of sampling techniques
was in some ways inevitable, as the Bureau continues to strive to achieve
greater accuracy. Utah v. Evans provided an easy out, a way of dealing with
changing times that was quicker than amending the Census Act or the
Constitution.
The courts must also be aware that the manipulation of census
procedures is now easier.2°4 Just as the party in power does its best to stay in
power by redistricting, the Census Bureau may, with the Supreme Court's
blessing, now protect the administration in power when deciding on what
process to use in their counting. By running the numbers with and without
imputation, the government could now assure the option that guarantees the
best chance of remaining in power is chosen.2 °5
The number of lawsuits arising from the census will now increase, as the
Utah v. Evans decision did nothing to clarify the Census Act or the "actual
enumeration" clause of the Constitution.2 6 Thus, reapportionment issues
that deal with sampling will be litigated on a case-by-case basis. The Court
has set no bright line rules, and because reapportionment cases take a more
direct route to the Supreme Court, more of the Court's time will be spent
dispensing with challenges similar to this one.
Citizens, especially those in Utah, may be reluctant to participate in a
process they view either as unfair or unconstitutional. If people are. lethargic
201. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for the number and type of employees used in
conducting the Census.
202. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the undercount.
203. See generally Gearan, supra note 13.
204. There did not appear to be any partisan manipulation involved in the Utah v. Evans case as
the Republican controlled executive branch sided with the State of North Carolina which had five
Democrats and eight Republican House members in 2000, while Utah had two Republican House
members and one Democrat. U.S. Congress, Member Directory, at http://www.access.gpo.gov
/congress/browse-cd-02.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
205. In the case of the 2000 census, the alternative was to insert zero values for the data that had
been imputed. To some this appeared contrary to the spirit of completing an accurate census, but
would not have created a controversy. See supra notes 96-97, 165, and accompanying text for a
discussion of how assigning a zero value is the alternative to using imputation.
206. It is hard to read the decisions in House of Representatives and Evans and glean any bright-
line rules regarding when sampling is allowed. It is even harder to conceive of clearer language than
"actual enumeration" that could have been used by the Framers to achieve what they wanted, a
"headcount." Appellant's Brief at 37, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714).
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about voting because they are dissatisfied with their elected representatives,
it is safe to assume that dissatisfaction with the census may lead to decreased
. 207 tcooperation. However, the 2000 Presidential election may have helped
convince citizens that their vote counts, and by analogy the close race
between Utah and North Carolina for the 435th seat in the House of
Representatives may demonstrate to citizens the importance of returning
their census forms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, it looks as though the Supreme Court has begun to tread
a slippery slope. By turning their back on the decision in House of
Representatives, the Court has invited the Census Bureau to delve deeper
into processes that are not an "actual count" and walk the line towards a
sample. The Court either failed to realize the long term effects of their
decision or was afraid to challenge the President to correct the Bureau's
error. Regardless, the procedures for taking the census will never be the
same. The Census Bureau may now attempt to stretch the decision in Evans
even further in 2010 to include other forms of "sampling in disguise."
Nathan T. Dwyer2 8
207. See supra note 72 and accompanying text for the percentage of persons who returned their
Census form in the year 2000.
208. Associate Attorney, Robinson & Kole Attorneys, Bellingham, WA; J.D., Cum Laude,
Pepperdine University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Cum Laude, Western Washington University,
2000. The author would like to thank his friends and family who made his law school experience,
including work on this article, so enjoyable and memorable. Special thanks to Mom, Dad, and
Shenaya.
1078
